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GARNISHMENT: CONTINGENT INTERESTS
The Supreme Court of Arizona has recently decided a case involving a rather rare fact situation and the interpretation of its garnishment
statutes. The case dealt with many questions concerning the proper use
of garnishment proceedings, but this analysis will be limited to the
matter of contingent interests. The court found that the balance of the
purchase price to be paid under an installment land contract at the time
of the service of the garnishment writ was an "indebtedness due," and
therefore subject to garnishment. Weir v. Galbraith.'
Judgment had been entered in the principal action on a promissory
note for the plaintiff, Galbraith, and against defendant, Weir. In the
garnishment action, Galbraith was attempting to satisfy this judgment.
Weir had sold real estate to one Rodriquez under a land contract for
$20,000, the down payment being $1,000 with the balance to be paid in
monthly installments of $250.00. At the time of service of writs of
garnishment, most of the payments remained unmatured. The defendant
contended that ".

.

. the writ was not effective to impound installments

maturing after the date of service because those installments are contingent and may never become due." 2 The Arizona statutes (along with
those of Wisconsin and most other states) require an "indebtedness"
which is "due" or "presently owing. ' 3 The court, without citation of
authority, found that such an installment land contract created a definite,
fixed, and absolute obligation to pay the purchase price which could not
be defeated by the contingency rule. The court stated that:
The purchase price balance at any time outstanding is presently
owing to the seller, although the time for payment is postponed.
The installments are not separate and independent debts but are
part of an entire debt created at the signing of the contract by the
parties. 4
The arguments submitted in the briefs of counsel in this case indicate that the problem is essentially one of semantics. The appellants
felt that the lower court's judgment was erroneous in that it included
future installments which were not yet due and payable at the time of
service of the writ of garnishment. They also argued that the court had
no jurisdiction over funds which became due and payable at a later
date. Appellants compared future installment payments to unearned
wages under an agreement of employment (which cannot be garnished
because they are deemed contingent upon performance of the work by
the employee)5 and, therefore, maintained that they were entirely con' Weir v. Galbraith, 92 Ariz. 279, 376 P. 2d 396 (1962).
2 Id., 376 P. 2d at 400.
3A~iz. Rxv. STATs. §12 1574 (1956); see also Wis. STATs. §267.18(4) (1961)

construed in Edwards v. Roepke, 74 Wis. 571, 43 N.W. 554 (1889).

4 Weir v. Galbraith, supra note 1, 376 P. 2d at 401.
5

Foster v. Singer, 69 Wis. 392, 34 N.W. 395 (1887) and many subsequent
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tingent until the last installment was due. Appellees also used the word
"due" in asserting that the obligation to pay the entire purchase price
was a debt unconditionally due even though the time for payment had
been deferred. Appellants interpreted the word due as meaning presently
payable, while appellees considered it to mean presently owing (even
if the payment is deferred). The court's decision accepts the latter interpretation of the Arizona statutes.
Disregarding the use of the word "due," the problem of what is a
presently owing debt which can be garnished, and what is a contingent
debt, still faces the great majority of the practitioners across the country. While this problem is essentially one of local statutory interpretation, one can ascertain a few general principles concerning the prohibitions against the garnishment of contingent interests. "In the absence of statutes to the contrary, a debt which is uncertain and contingent, in the sense that it may never become due and payable, is not
subject to garnishment."'6 Only a few states have by statute provided
for the garnishment of contingent debts. 7 Wisconsin has provided by
statute that a contingent debt is not subject to garnishment, while a
presently owing debt with a schedule of deferred payments is. 8 It may
be generally stated, that the indebtedness sought to be garnished must
be due without contingency at the time of service of the writ of garnishment (or at the date of answer thereto) . This being accepted, the
specific questions then to be posed are what constitutes such a contingency and is an installment land contract within that category. Subsequent discussion will primarily be geared to the problem as viewed
under the Wisconsin and similar statutory interpretations using the
Weir case only as the sole reported example concerning the attempted
garnishment of the proceeds of an installment land contract.
It then must be ascertained what debts are to be deemed contingent.
They have been defined as follows: "A contingent claim is one where
liability hinges upon some future event, which may or may not occur;
it is dependent upon some condition as yet unperformed." '0,
There seems to be general agreement that this "contingency," is a
condition rendering the obligation itself uncertain (not merely its payment) .11Several cases have arisen where the essential dispute revolved
cases have held that unearned wages are contingent (see Shepard's Wisconsin Citations).

6 38 C.J.S. Garnishments§87 (1949).
7KAN. Rzv. STAT. ANN. ch. 60 §946 (1923); MICH. Comp. LAWS §13123(2)
(1915); IOWA CODE ANN. §12143 (Whitney 1924).
8W's. STATS. §267.18(4), (5)(1961).
9 Edwards v.Roepke, 74 Wis. 571, 43 N.W. 554 (1889); Vollmer v. Chicago

and Northwestern Railroad, 86 Wis. 305, 56 N.W. 919 (1893); Zimek v.
Illinois National Casualty Co., 370 Ill. 572, 19 N.E. 2d 620 (1939); for
numerous other cases to the same effect see Annot., 134 A.L.R. 862.
10 Zimek v. Illinois National Casualty Co., supra note 9, 19 N.E. 2d at 623 (1939).
11 "The uncertainty contemplated by the law is one that conditions the obliga-
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around an interpretation of the meaning of "contingency" in the garnishment statutes or prior decisions.' 2 These controversies have consistently resulted in the courts' pointing out the differences between postponed or future payment and contingent obligations. The possibility
that a condition subsequent may defeat the payment of a presently owing obligation has no effect on the availability of garnishment. 3 If the
debt has come into existence, a debtor-creditor relationship exists and
the time and manner of payment are immaterial for the purpose of garnishment. It is the existence of the liability itself that must not be contingent.14 A debt, to be "due" as the word is used in the garnishment
statutes, need not be presently payable or liquidated, and the fact that
the debt may be defeated by a condition subsequent will not put it beyond the reach of garnishment. 15
Thus there is no problem in determining that in most states, a contingent debt cannot be garnished and a presently owing debt with deferred payments under a contractual agreement is subject to garnishment. The problem, however, is to determine which of these categories
an installment land contract falls within. Of the various tests which
have been applied to determine if a garnishable, non-contingent, presently owing, due debt exists, the following has found general acceptance:
The only debts from a garnishee to a defendant which are subject to garnishment under the Alabama statutes are those which
may be made the basis of an action of debt or indebitatus assumpsit by the defendant against the garnishee, so that the test
here is whether at the time of the service of the writ or at some
time subsequent thereto, the defendant had or will certainly have
in the future such a cause of action against the garnishee. 16
tion itself. The contingency must affect the actual liability of the garnishee."
Knudson v. Anderson, 199 Minn. 479, 272 N.W. 376, 377 (1937).
12 See as examples: National Surety Co. v. Hurley, 31 N.D. 343, 153 N.W. 470
(1915); Molloy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 129 Conn. 251, 27 A. 2d
387 (1942); Balaban v. Willett, 305 Il. App. 388, 27 N.E. 2d 612 (1940);
Calechman v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 120 Conn. 265, 180 A. 450
(1935).
13 This can be determined by analyzing the difference between Wis. STATs.
§267.18(4) (1961) which states, "No person shall be liable as garnishee:
... (4) By reason of any thing owing him upon a contingency." and (5)
which states, ". . . except as above provided judgment may be given for
any thing owing, although it has not become due in which case the garnishee
shall not be required to pay or deliver it before the time appointed by the
contract."
14 In Minnesota as in most states contingent claims are not subject to garnishment. "Contingency" as used in 2 MASON'S MINN. STATUTES §9361(1) (1927)
has been held to mean a contingency in the obligation or debt itself and
not in its payment. Irwin v. McKechnie, 58 Minn. 145, 59 N.W. 987 (1894);
Knudson v. Anderson, 199 Minn. 479, 272 N.W. 376 (1937).
15 Calechman v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 120 Conn. 265, 180 At. 450,
100 A.L.R. 302 (1935); This is also true under the various interpretations
of Wis. STATS. §267.18(4), (5) (1961) ; see Wis. STAT. ANN. §267.18 (1957).
16 Schaefer v. Post and Flagg, 10 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ala. 1935).
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Therefore, the most comprehensive test of liability to garnishee process
is whether or not the person sought to be charged could have been sued
by the defendant. Under such a test, the possibility that a future state of
events may arise before the day of payment, which creates a defense
to an action in debt, does not render the debt contingent. This test is
actually a convenient way to determine if the garnishee defendant possesses funds or credits which the principal defendant has a right to
obtain. If he does, they are garnishable.
As previously pointed out, Wisconsin is in complete accord with the
general principles stated on this subject. The Wisconsin garnishment
statutes 1 7 are very complete and concise in defining when liability as a
garnishee exists. Section 267.17 clearly indicates that even unmatured
debts can be garnished: ". . . for all his debts due or to become due to
the defendant. . . ." (here "due" must be interpreted to mean "unmatured" rather than "contingent"). This is even more obvious from a
reading of section 267.18(5)."' While this statute is seemingly patent,
and easily understood, no cases have arisen in Wisconsin which place
a land contract within it, leaving some doubt as to possible interpretations.
In light of the language of section 267.18(5), however, the exact
import of section 267.18(4) 19 is not clearly understood. It would seem
that the presence of language recognizing presently owing but unmatured claims as garnishable, would require the obvious and proper interpretation of "contingency" in section 267.18(4) as relating to the
obligation itself. Without listing all of the Wisconsin cases which have
arisen involving attempted garnishment of a possibly contingent debt,
it can be stated that any contingencies found were clearly and unmistakably such as to render the obligation itself doubtful. 20 Wisconsin
cases state that the debt must be absolutely owing with no question of
contingency as to the indebtedness itself.21 A relatively recent Wisconsin decision 22 found that an unmatured but owing obligation could
not be set-off against a matured obligation. The court seemed to imply
that it recognized the obvious meaning of sections 267.17 and 267.18(5),
but held that it did not apply to set-offs. The court reasoned that to
allow a debt not due, although owing, to be set off against one already
§§267.01, 267.17, 267.18 (1961).
judgment may be given for anything owing, although it has not become

17 WIs STATS.
18 "..

due (matured) in which case the garnishee shall not be required to pay or
deliver it before the time appointed by the contract."
19 "No person shall be liable as garnishee .... (4) by reason of anything owing
by him upon a contingency."

Edwards v. Roepke, 74 Wis. 571, 43 N.W. 554 (1889), Foster v. Singer, 69 Wis.
392, 34 N.W. 395 (1887).
21Vollmer v. Chicago and North Western Railroad Co., 86 Wis. 306, 56 N.W.

20

22

919 (1853).
Mattek v. Hoffman, 272 Wis. 503, 76 N.W. 2d 300 (1956).
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matured would be to change the contract and advance the time of payment of the yet unmatured debt.
It appears that in the midst of this semantic dilemma, the Wisconsin
statutes differentiate the concepts of "contingency" and "owing." That
is to say, as long as a debt is "owing," it is not "contingent." The fact
that the "owing" may cease to exist upon the happening of future events
is immaterial as long as it is absolute at the time of service of the writ
of garnishment. The contingency of which section 267.18(4) speaks, is
a condition precedent to the obligation of the debt itself. Such a construction of these statutes is directly in line with their purpose, namely
that of holding the garnishee defendant free from any liability because
of the garnishment proceedings for which he may never become actually
liable to the principal defendant. The garnishee defendant should not be
detrimented by the garnishment proceedings.
The problem still remains as to where the practitioner shall place
a land contract under the above construction of the Wisconsin law on
garnishments. Are the obligations incurred under such a contract
"presently owing" liabilities, and thus subject to garnishment, or are
the future, unpaid installments "contingent" upon some condition yet
to be performed by the vendor? No reported cases have supplied an
answer to this question. However, the few examples which follow are
taken from various states for the purpose of shedding some light on
the prevalent judicial thinking along related lines.
In 1923, the Supreme Court of Iowa in the case of Armstrong v.
Armstrong23 held that where the principal defendant and the garnishee
had entered into a contract for the sale of a farm to the garnishee, with
title to pass on payment of the purchase price and delivery of a deed
evincing good and marketable title, the proceeds of the interim contract
for the sale of land were not subject to garnishment. This resulted from
a determination by the court that the debt created by such a contract
was contingent upon the delivery of a deed by the vendor, showing good
and marketable title. In other words, the debt against the vendee was
contingent upon the vendor's willingness and ability to perform. The
court refused to adopt the theory that the contingency could be erased
by the passage of equitable title to the vendee at the time of the signing
of the contract. The court stated:
... payment of the consideration could not be enforced against
him (the vendee) even if every other requirement of the contract was complied with, until a deed conveying the farm to him,
free and clear of all encumbrances except those assumed by him
... was tendered to him. The indebtedness did not become absolute until that was done.2 4
23

24

196 Iowa 947, 192 N.W. 887 (1923).
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 196 Iowa 947, 192 N.W. 887, 888 (1923).
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The Iowa court cited Becker v. Becker, 25 a Wisconsin case, to support
this holding. The Becker case held that the debt for the sale of land
does not become absolute until the delivery of the deed. The Wisconsin
court stated that the right to the proceeds of the sale do not become
absolute in the vendor until his performance, thus making the debt
contingent (and under Edwards v. Roepke,26 not subject to garnishment). Other cases in various states have reached a like conclusion on
similar facts.

27

At least one case draws a clear distinction between the proceeds due
under an interim land contract and a mortgage.281 The court therein
states:
In my opinion there is a clear distinction between monies due
under a mortgage and those under an agreement of sale. Under
a mortgage, the debt becomes an unconditional liability at the
time fixed for payment. Under an agreement of sale, the debt
at the time fixed for payment is conditioned upon the vendor's
being able to make title, and where he has no title, the purchase
money never becomes payable. 29
Here again one is faced with a dilemma. Is one to align the installment
land contract with a mortgage due to their similarity as a form of
financing real estate transactions? If this is done the technical passage
of legal title, which follows delivery of the deed at the outset of the
mortgage agreement and following the last payment of an installment
land contract, must be disregarded. The alternative is to place great
emphasis on the passage of legal title and hold that the installment land
contract and the interim land contract must be treated alike because legal
title passes in neither until after the attempted garnishment.
A rather unique example of the garnishment of the proceeds of the
sale of real estate is presented by the Wisconsin court in Aschermann v.
Hart.30 In this case the parents of Charles Hart sold him a hotel property for $33,000, paying $2,000 down and the rest in equal monthly
installments. This was done by parol and no deed was executed. Charles
became financially embarrassed and agreed with his parents to rescind
the contract and return the property in exchange for their promise to
pay his debts. The plaintiff sued Charles as principal defendant on a
debt, and garnished his parents on the basis of their contractual obligation to pay Charles' debts. The Wisconsin court held that this was a
"presently owing" debt, subject to garnishment. The Wisconsin court
25 112 Wis. 24, 87 N.W. 830 (1901).
26 74 Wis. 571, 43 N.W. 554 (1889).
River State Bank v. Japinga, 37 S.D. 404, 158
Cowell v. May, 26 Mont. 163, 66 Pac. 843 (1901).
28 Barsi v. Farcas, 18 Sask. L.R. 158, 1 D.L.R. 1154 (1924).
law concerning the prohibition against the garnishment
the same as that of Wisconsin and the majority of the
29 Id., 1 D.L.R. at 1160.
30 Ascherman v. Hart, 109 Wis. 38, 85 N.W. 121 (1901).
27 'oreau

N.W. 786 (1916);

The Saskatchewan
of contingencies is
United States.
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has also held that the proceeds due under a contract for the construction of a building are contingent and not subject to garnishment until
the work is completed.3 1 There is at least one authority to the effect
that where the seller receives the purchase price and thereafter fails to
deliver good title by reason of a breach of warranty, he may be charged
as the purchaser's garnishee to the extent of the purchase price paid.This type of decision, of course, does not help solve the problem of
what can be done in the case of the non-defaulting vendor, as in Weir v.
Galbraith.33 The federal courts have also held that a debt must be
"presently owing" to be garnishable. In the case of Smith v. MVarker3 4
the court held that where the garnishees agreed to pay the debtor the
price of certain land after the period of contest had expired, if the title
was vested in the debtor at that time, there could not be garnishment
because the period of contest had not yet run and there was a possibility that the debtor would not have title at the requisite time, thus
negating the liability. Can it then be said that the debt evinced by the
remaining payments of an installment land contract could be negated
by discovery of a lack of good title in the vendor, making the future
installments contingent upon his delivery of good title?
The Texas court35 in a case involving a garnishment of the proceeds
of the sale of land, indicates by negative inference that if it is provided
in the contract that the vendor must deliver an unclouded title, then a
potential cloud on the title could create a contingency sufficient to bar
garnishment. The court in this case held that there were no clouds on
the title in question, but the inference can be drawn from such decision
that if there had been, and if the contract had provided for their removal as a condition precedent to payment, then the debt itself would
have become contingent and would not have been subject to garnishment. This reasoning also might be said to apply to the installment land
contract case where the delivery of a deed showing good and marketable
title upon tender of the last payment could be considered to be a condition precedent to the payment of all the prior installments. It must always be born in mind, however, that the price of property sold on
credit can be reached by garnishment, 36 if there is no condition precedent
yet to be performed by the vendor.
This author's research reveals that there have been no cases reported
in any common law jurisdiction involving an attempt to garnishee the
Wis. 303, 97 N.W. 897 (1904). This is also the law in other states; e.g.,
Acushnet Saw Mills Co. v. St. Pierre, 316 Mass. 621, 55 N.E. 2d 900 (1944).
32 Fleming v. Pringle, 21 Civ. 229, 51 S.W. 553 (1899).
33 Weir v. Galbraith, supra note 1.
34 Smith v. Marker, 6 Ind. T. 213, 90 S.W. 611 (1905), aff'd, 154 Fed. 838 (8th
Cir. 1907).
35 Looney v. Pope, 148 S.W. 1170 (Texas 1912).
36 See Citizen's State Bank v. Carda, 47 S.D. 29, 195 N.W. 828 (1923) for an
example of an application of this principle to sale of real estate.
31120

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

7
unpaid installments of a land contract prior to Weir v. Galbraith.3
The principles concerning the prohibition against the garnishments of
contingent interests, however, are ingrained into the law and the cases
are old and numerous which interpret and define these various contingencies. Thus, the inherent characteristics of the installment land
contract must be examined to determine if the payment of the individual installments is based upon some condition yet to be performed
by the vendor. The installment land contract has just recently come of
age. Its use has become much more extensive and its characteristics
have been studied to a great extent in recent years. The traditional view
is that legal title is in the vendor until tender of the final payment to
him by the vendee, at which time the vendor delivers a deed to the
vendee. During the time of the installment payments, equitable title lies

in the vendee by virtue of the contract .

3

An installment land contract is not an ordinary contract since it confers possessory rights on the vendee, much akin to the effect of a conveyance. 39 Before the "contingency" question can be answered, it must
be ascertained whether or not the installment land contract vendee can
be considered to be the legal owner of the land during the time he is
making the payments, prior to the delivery of any deed. If the vendee
is considered the owner it could be said that there is no condition to
be performed as yet by the vendor and thus the debt is not contingent
and becomes subject to garnishment.
The Wisconsin statutes provide that every interest in lands is a
legal right. 40 A land contract obviously comes within the purview of
section 231.03 because it is an immediate grant of rents and profits along
with the possession of land.41 The estate of the vendee can therefore
be treated as a legal one. The Wisconsin court has referred to the installment land contract as a "presently executed sale." 42 This is greatly
different from an interim land contract which confers no title on the
vendee and yet remains to be performed. The Wisconsin court has held
3 Weir v. Galbraith, supra note 1.

38 See Krakow v. Willie, 125 Wis. 284, 103 N.W. 1121 (1905), describing these

traditional views.

90, 91, 200 N.W. 662, 663 (1924).
and modified in this chapter, are
abolished; and every estate and interest in lands shall be deemed a legal
right, cognizable as such in the courts of law, except when otherwise provided
in these statutes." Wis STATS. §231.01 (1961). "Every person, who, by virtue of
any grant, assignment or devise, now is or hereafter shall be entitled to the
actual possession of lands and the receipt of the rents and profits thereof,
in law or in equity, shall be deemed to have a legal estate therein of the
same quality and duration and subject to the same conditions as his beneficial interest." Wis. STATS. §231.03 (1961) ; See also, comment by Oliver S.
Rundell which states, ". . . provided that any person entitled to the possession
of land should have a legal estate corresponding to his beneficial interest."
Wis. STAT. ANN. §84 (1957).
41 Krakow v. Willie, supra note 38.
42 State Bank of La Crosse v. Beinfang, 133 Wis. 431, 113 N.W. 726 (1907).

39 See Freimann v. Cumming, 185 Wis. 88,
40 "Uses and trusts, except as authorized
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by virtue of Harley v. Harley,43 that for all practical purposes, the land

contract vendee has legal title at least by the time he completes his payments, implying that the deed only evinces the title and does not convey
it. If this is to be the interpretation then there can be no condition yet
actively to be performed by the vendor so as to create a contingency.
The vendee of the installment land contract is recognized as the legal
owner for many other purposes. A pledge of the vendee's interest as
the security for a debt constitutes a real estate mortgage." The vendee's
interest is not subject to a claim of dower by the wife of the deceased
vendor. 45 The vendee has been allowed to bring an action in trover for

the removal of timber from the land sold under the land contract. 4 The
vendee's estate is subject to judgment liens against him. The vendee
is recognized as the owner for tax exemption purposes.48 As seen from
the above authority, at least the Wisconsin court seems to recognize the
legal character of the vendee's estate. This makes the installment land
contract an executed sale with no condition precedent to performance
remaining after the signing of the contract itself. It can therefore be
argued that the Wisconsin court would align an installment contract
with a mortgage, allowing the vendee to become a garnishee as was done
in Weir v. Galbraith.Wisconsin would apparently agree with Barsi v.
Farcas and differentiate between an installment land contract and an
interim contract for the sale of land, making the proceeds of the former
garnishable and the latter not.
STEPHEN L. BEYER

Harley v. Harley, 140 Wis. 282, 122 N.W. 761 (1909).
Security State Bank v. Monona Golf Club, 213 Wis. 581, 252 N.W. 287 (1934).
45 Mueller v. Novelty Dye Works, 273 Wis. 501, 78 N.W. 2d 881 (1956).
46 Martin v. Schofield, 41 Wis. 167 (1876).
47 Van Camp v. Peerenboom, 14 Wis. 65 (1861).
48 Ritchie v.Green Bay,215 Wis.433,254 N.W.113 (1934).
49 1 D.L.R. 1154 (1924).
43
44

